Social intuitionist theory

The key differences between social intuitionism (Haidt, 2001) and Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1984) lie in their views on the source, process, and social context of moral judgment.

Source of Moral Judgment

Social Intuitionism: Moral judgments are primarily driven by rapid, automatic intuitions that occur before conscious reasoning. These intuitions are shaped by cultural, social, and evolutionary factors (Haidt, 2001).

Kohlberg’s Theory: Moral judgments are the result of deliberate, conscious reasoning that progresses through a sequence of increasingly sophisticated stages. Kohlberg emphasizes the role of cognitive development in moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984).

Process of Moral Judgment

Social Intuitionism: Reasoning is typically post-hoc, serving to justify or rationalize moral judgments after the fact. People often cannot provide rational explanations for their moral reactions, a phenomenon known as moral dumbfounding (Haidt, 2001).

Kohlberg’s Theory: Reasoning is central to the process of moral judgment. Individuals progress through stages of moral reasoning, each characterized by more advanced and abstract forms of ethical thought (Kohlberg, 1984).

Social and Cultural Context

Social Intuitionism: Moral judgments are heavily influenced by social and cultural context. Intuitions are shaped by the social environment, and reasoning is used to persuade others and manage social impressions (Haidt, 2001).

Kohlberg’s Theory: The theory is more individualistic and universal, focusing on the internal cognitive processes that lead to moral development. It posits a universal sequence of stages that is less influenced by social context (Kohlberg, 1984).

Empirical Evidence

Social Intuitionism: Supported by research on moral dumbfounding and the role of emotions in moral decision-making (Haidt, 2001).

Kohlberg’s Theory: Supported by longitudinal studies of moral reasoning and the use of moral dilemmas to assess moral development (Kohlberg, 1984).

The Theory of the DNA-Self fills the gap

Our own theory of the DNA-self suggests that initially, a new-born child will have a schema pre-populated with reflexes as well as higher level, intuitive responses, and that there is an intuitive symbolic interface, which automatically seeks to link these genetically passed-on intuitive responses to externally perceived symbols and patterns.

We can therefore suggest, that these reflex responses, which include panic responses such as fight-or-flight, must sit in compartmentalised schemas, which have priority access, and must also be highly optimised, to ensure rapid execution.

This concept supports social intuitionism, it suggests that as the infant develops, it will intuitively collect symbols and patterns, and try to match those to pre-existing organismic functions, which the organism knows have been tried and tested, and fine-tuned with each new generation since that function was first created.

We also suggest, that the schema holding an automatic, genetically originated system response, can be over-written or modified. In other words, as the child’s cognitive abilities increase, and it’s symbolic brain matches patterns into action, via brain to motor connections held in the schema, then this, itself will allow the child’s thoughts to negotiate itself through all of those symbols to eventually arrive at a coordinated movement.

Therefore, we can see that as the child grows intellectually more complex, then these automatic responses will be modified, if needed, and also, new intuitive reflexes can be created, to be passed on, to future generations.

Therefore, we can also confirm support for Kohlberg’s Stage Theory, in that intuitive localisation allows for responses to be both highly automatic and intuitive, but also, for the individual to choose to not follow an intuitive response, and to take time to think of another way.

References